Climate policies have stochastic consequences that involve a great number of generations. This calls for evaluating social risk (what kind of societies will future people be born into) rather than individual risk (what will happen to people during their own lifetimes). We respond to this call by proposing and axiomatizing probability adjusted rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarianism (PARDCLU) through a key axiom ensuring that the social welfare order both is ethical and satisfies first-order stochastic dominance. PARDCLU yields a new useful perspective on intergenerational risks, is ethical in contrast to discounted utilitarianism, and avoids objections that have been raised against other ethical criteria. We show that PARDCLU handles situations with positive probability of human extinction and is linked to decision theory by yielding rank-dependent expected utilitarianism-but with additional structure-in a special case.
Introduction
This paper proposes a new normative criterion that can potentially be used for ranking climate policies. Climate policies seeking to abate anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have extremely long-term stochastic consequences, as greenhouse gas emissions cause environmental risks that extend into the far future. Therefore, to evaluate such policies one must assess risks that involve a great number of generations.
In this time frame, where people's lives are short compared to the time period for which the policies will have an effect, the objective social risk concerning what kind of societies will future people be born into might be more important than the subjective individual risk concerning what will happen to people during their own lifetimes.
That is, it might be reasonable to be more concerned about reducing the probability that future people will lead miserable lives, rather than avoiding volatility in the living conditions that people experience within their own lifetimes.
This motivates an approach that abstracts from lifetime fluctuations by assuming that people live for one period only. Moreover, the lives of the 'same' individual in two different future realizations might be considered as the lives of two different people, each living with the probability assigned to the realizations in question.
Hence, if a future individual has equal probability of living a good or bad life, then this might be modeled as two different people, one living a good life and one living a bad life, where each has probability 0.5 of coming into existence.
Different normative considerations arise in a setting where people do not experience fluctuations and risk within their own lifetime. In particular, we are not concerned about individual risk attitudes and the risk generations may face from an abstract ex ante point of view. We are only concerned with the final distribution of well-being. The important question for the evaluation of policies with long-term intergenerational effects is how to handle inequality. Clearly, if, for each chosen policy, all people -now and in all future realizations -have the same level of lifetime well-being, then this uniform well-being level can be used to rank policies. Thus, in our context, only social aversion to inequality matters, while subjective aversions to individual fluctuations and risk play no role.
By focusing on social risks, our approach differs from the vast literature on the aggregation of preferences under risk and uncertainty stemming from Harsanyi's 1 Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.11 (1955) seminal contribution. This literature has focused on respecting people preferences, in a context where the society and the individuals face the 'same' uncertainty, in the sense that uncertainty does not concern the mere existence of people. The contributions have wavered between an ex ante approach that relaxes rationality (Diamond, 1967; Epstein and Segal, 1992) to allow for ex ante fairness, and an ex post approach that fails the ex ante Pareto principle (Broome, 1991; Fleurbaey, 2010) to allow for ex post fairness. In the present paper, these issues do not arise because we interpret individuals in different events as different individuals: individuals are born only after the realization of events relevant for their lives. This interpretation is consistent with other papers focusing on social risk rather than individual risks (for instance Asheim and Brekke, 2002; Piacquadio, 2014) .
In the framework of Harsanyi's (1953) impartial observer theorem, Grant at al. (2010) have highlighted the distinction in social evaluation between lotteries over identities and lotteries over outcomes. We focus on lotteries over identities but add the complication that people may exist with different probabilities. We also depart from expected utility to address population ethics and equity concerns.
Our analysis will be confined to the case where there are objective assessments of the probabilities of different realizations. Hence, formally we will be concerned with risk rather than uncertainty. Moreover, we will assume that there is an indicator of lifetime well-being which is at least ordinally measurable and level comparable across people. Following the usual convention in population ethics, we will normalize the well-being scale so that lifetime well-being equal to 0 represents neutrality. Hence, a life with lifetime well-being above 0 is worth living; below 0, it is not.
We are concerned with normative evaluation where people are treated equally.
This differs from the common use of discounted utilitarianism in integrated assessment models of climate change, where transformed well-being (utility) is discounted by a constant and positive per-period time-discount rate. As a matter of principle, utilitarianism with time-discounting means that people across time are not treated equally. As a matter of practical policy evaluation, this criterion is virtually insensitive to the long-term effects of climate change, beyond year 2100 when the most serious consequences will occur, in particular for poor groups who are expected to bear the highest costs (see for instance World Bank, 2013) .
Equal treatment of people in axiomatic analysis is captured by the Anonymity axiom, whereby social evaluation is invariant to permuting two individuals' well-2 Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.11 being. Combined with sensitivity for the interests of all people, as captured by the Strong Pareto principle, this leads to the Suppes-Sen principle (Suppes, 1966; Sen, 1970) . This principle requires that one allocation be better than another if the former dominates the latter when being rank-ordered according to the levels of wellbeing. Conversely, the Suppes-Sen principle combined with the Continuity axiom implies both Anonymity and the Strong Pareto principle. A criterion that satisfies the Suppes-Sen principle is called ethical by Svensson (1980) . In this paper, we characterize an ethical criterion that avoids objections raised against other ethical criteria, e.g. utilitarian and egalitarian criteria.
Undiscounted utilitarianism, where utility is summed without discounting, is one criterion which satisfies the Suppes-Sen principle. However, when modeling the many potential future people by assuming that there are infinitely many generations, this criterion assigns zero relative weight to the present generation's interests. It leads to the unappealing prescription that the present generation should endure heavy sacrifices even if it contributes to only a tiny gain for all future generations.
Moreover, in a variable population setting with an unbounded number of potential people, it is subject to the Repugnant conclusion 1 or the Very sadistic conclusion. 2
The egalitarian criterion of maximizing the well-being of the worst-off generation (maximin) also satisfies the Suppes-Sen principle, but assigns zero relative weight to all generations but the worst-off. It leads to the unappealing prescription that the present generation should not do an even negligible sacrifice for the benefit of better off future generations. Maximin has also problematic implications when applied in a variable population setting (Arrhenius, forthcoming; Asheim and Zuber, 2014) .
This dilemma -that ethical criteria may to lead to extreme prescriptions in terms of sacrifice for future generations -motivates rank-discounted generalized utilitarianism (RDU), proposed and analyzed by Zuber and Asheim (2012) . RDU discounts future utility as long as the future is better off than the present, thereby trading-off current sacrifice and future gain. However, if the present generation is better off than all future generations, then priority shifts to the future. In this case, zero relative weight is assigned to present utility. RDU is compatible with equal treatment of generations as discounting is made according to rank, not according to time. Asheim and Zuber (2014) extend RDU to a variable population setting by proposing and axiomatizing rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarianism (RDCLU).
RDCLU avoids both the Repugnant and Very sadistic conclusions, thereby evading serious objections raised against other variable population criteria.
In the present paper we extend RDCLU to risky situations, including the case with positive probability of human extinction, by proposing the probability adjusted rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarian (PARDCLU) social welfare order (Definition 1). We start out in Section 2 by developing a framework where each (potential) individual is characterized by a level of lifetime well-being and a probability of existence. We show how this set-up is equivalent to a formulation where the individuals are distributed through time and over risky states. In this alternative dynamic framework individuals live for one period only and are not subjected to risk during their lifetime, reflecting our intergenerational perspective.
We then, in Section 3, present an axiomatic foundation for PARDCLU through Theorem 1. A key axiom, called Probability adjusted Suppes-Sen, generalizes the Suppes-Sen principle to a setting where people need not exist with probability one.
In conjunction with the Continuity axiom, it implies invariance to permutations of individuals with the same well-being and the same probability of existence. It also entails invariance to the replacement of one individual with given well-being and probability with two individuals having the same well-being and whose probabilities of existence sum up the probability of the original individual. In the special case where the individual probabilities of existence sum up to one, Probability adjusted Suppes-Sen corresponds to first-order stochastic dominance. Hence, this axiom can be also considered as a generalization of first-order stochastic dominance to a normative multi-person setting. The proof of Theorem 1 (contained in Appendix A) shows that, although the axiomatic system is closely related to the one found in Asheim and Zuber (2014, Section 3), our main result is not a trivial extension, because probabilities are real numbers and we only use a weak Continuity axiom.
In Section 4 we illustrate the usefulness of PARDCLU by showing how PARD-CLU handles human extinction. Moreover, when individual probabilities of existence sum up to one, PARDCLU yields rank-dependent expected utilitarianism, but with additional structure. This additional structure derives from the axiom Existence 4 Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.11 independence of the worst-off, which plays the same role as Koopmans' (1960) stationarity postulate. In Section 5 we demonstrate additional properties (proven in Appendix B) of PARDCLU in terms of distributional equity and population ethics.
In the final Section 6 we discuss some issues faced by the PARDCLU approach and provide concluding remarks.
Two equivalent frameworks
In this section we establish a perfect correspondence between an abstract framework with a set of atemporal allocations and a more descriptive dynamic framework. Our axiomatization will be developed in the former framework for the sake of simplicity.
Allocations and social welfare relation. Let N denote positive integers and N 0 denote the non-negative integers. Let R denote the real numbers and R + (resp. R ++ ) denote the non-negative (resp. positive) real numbers.
Individuals are described by two numbers: their lifetime well-being and their probability of existence. An allocation x ∈ (R × (0, 1]) n determines the finite population size, n(x) = n, and the distribution of pairs of well-being and probability,
among the n(x) individuals who make up the population. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n(x)}, x w i is the individual's well-being and x p i is his probability of existence. We denote by ν(x) = n(x) i=1 x p i the probability adjusted population size of x and by
n the set of possible finite allocations.
As mentioned in the introduction, we follow the usual convention in population ethics, by letting lifetime well-being equal to 0 represents neutrality, above which a life, as a whole, is worth living, and below which, it is not.
A social welfare relation (SWR) on the set X is a binary relation , where for all x, y ∈ X, x y implies that the allocation x is deemed socially at least as good as y. Let ∼ and denote the symmetric and asymmetric parts of .
For each x ∈ X, let π : {1, . . . , n(x)} → {1, . . . , n(x)} be a bijection that reorders individuals in increasing well-being order: Let ρ 0 = 0 and define the probability adjusted rank ρ r inductively as follows:
for r ∈ {1, . . . , n(x)}. Define the rank-ordered allocation
and write x [0] := lim ρ↓0 x [ρ] . Note that the permutation π need not be unique (if, for instance, x w i = x w i for some i = i ), but the resulting rank-ordered allocation x [ ] is unique. Note also that the definitions imply that ρ n(x) = ν(x).
For every ν ∈ R, write X ν = {x ∈ X : ν(x) = ν} for the set of finite allocations with probability adjusted population size equal to ν. For x, y ∈ X ν , write
for some ρ ∈ (0, ν]; note that, by the definitions of the step functions
all ρ in a subset of (0, ν] that includes a non-empty proper interval.
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be denoted by (z) ν , where ν = np. For x ∈ X, z ∈ R, p ∈ (0, 1] and n ∈ N, let y ∈ (R×(0, 1]) n(x)+n such that (y w i , y Let Ω be the space of states of the world. Endow Ω with the σ-algebra F, being the collection of all Lebesgue measurable subsets of Ω, and a probability measure p : F → [0, 1], so that (Ω, F, p) is a probability space. The states are exogenously given and their probabilities cannot be influenced. One can think of the probabilities as a priori expert opinions used by the social decision maker in a Bayesian setting.
We assume that time is discrete. An information structure, (I t ) t∈N , determines the process through which the true state is learned. Formally, I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I t , . . . is a countable sequence of finite partitions of Ω where, for each t ∈ N, (i) p(i t ) > 0 for all i t ∈ I t and (ii) I t+1 is a weak refinement of I t . The information structure (I t ) t∈N determines a filtration (F t ) t∈N of F where, for each t ∈ N, F t is the collection of all 6 Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.11 unions of sets in I t (including the empty set).
For given information structure (I t ) t∈N , an allocation process, w = (w t ) t∈N , is a process from N × Ω to n∈N 0 R n which is adapted to the filtration (F t ) t∈N so that, for each t ∈ N, w t : Ω → n∈N 0 R n is an F t -measurable function. Here R 0 represents the set containing only the situation where no one exists. The allocation process w maps each period-state pair (t, ω) ∈ N × Ω into w t (ω) ∈ R n , which determines the population size, n t w (ω) = n and the distribution of well-being,
if n t w (ω) > 0 and the situation where no one exists if n t w (ω) = 0. Thus, w determines a population process, n w = (n t w ) t∈N , where, for each t ∈ N, n t w : Ω → N 0 is an F tmeasurable function. We require that, for any allocation process w, there exists t(w) ∈ N such that n t w (ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω if and only if t > t(w). Hence, the total probability adjusted population size, t∈N Ω n t w (ω)dp(ω), is positive and finite. The social decision maker evaluates ((I t ) t∈N , w). For any such pair, we obtain, for each period t ∈ N and each smallest non-empty F t -measurable event i t ∈ I t with n t w (i t ) > 0, a distribution of pairs of wellbeing and probability:
Concatenating such vectors over all periods t ∈ N and all events i t ∈ I t with n t (i t ) > 0 yields a vector x in the set of possible finite allocations, X, since there are only a finite number of period-event pairs (t, i t ) with positive population. In particular, the probability adjusted population size of x, ν(x), equals t∈N Ω n t w (ω)dp(ω). This establishes that any pair ((I t ) t∈N , w) can be mapped to an allocation in X.
Conversely, we can map any allocation
. To see that, first re-order the components of x to obtain a new allocationx such thatx
. Construct the sequence (I t ) n∈N of partitions inductively in the following way:
1. Ifx p 1 = 1, then I 1 = {Ω} with E 1 denoting ∅, and ifx
3. For t > n(x), I t = I n(x) with E t denoting Ω.
Construct the adapted allocation process w = (w t ) t∈N by, for all t ∈ N, w t (ω) =x w t if ω ∈ Ω\E t and w t (ω) maps to the situation where no one exists if ω ∈ E t . Hence, in each period there exists at most one individual and only in periods t ≤ n(x) and in states whose total probability isx p t . The well-being of the individual in period t when he exists isx w t . Clearly, the pair ((I t ) t∈N , w) permits to produce the allocationx of well-being and probabilities of existence, which is the same as x up to a permutation.
There are of course more realistic ways of doing so, where e.g. individuals with the same probability of existence belong to the same generation.
The pair ((I t ) t∈N , w) is endogenously given by the policies chosen in the economy. to accelerate the refinement of the state space partition.
In this formulation, individuals' identities are implicitly defined by the information structure. An individual at time t exists only in one event i t of the partition I t that reflects the information available at period t. This also implies that individuals live for one period only and are not subjected to risk during their lifetime. 3 Each potential individual is born after the realization of the event relevant for his identity, and all risk in the economy is borne by society. Our focus on intergenerational issues motivates this abstraction from lifetime fluctuations and individual risk.
The choice of the pair ((I t ) t∈N , w) will be limited by the feasibility constraints concerning the possibility for learning and the development of well-being and population. As we are concerned with modeling the social decision maker's preferences over such pairs, such feasibility constraints will not be discussed here.
Probability adjusted rank-discounted critical-level utilitarianism can be characterized by the following seven axioms.
The first three axioms are sufficient to ensure numerical representation of the SWR for any fixed probability adjusted population size. They also entail that individuals are treated anonymously and with sensitivity to their well-being.
Axiom 1 (Order) The relation is complete, reflexive and transitive on X.
An SWR satisfying Axiom 1 is called a social welfare order (SWO).
Axiom 2 (Continuity) For all ν ∈ R ++ and x ∈ X ν , the sets y ∈ X ν : y x and y ∈ X : x y are closed for the topology induced by the supnorm applied to rank-ordered allocations. 4 Axiom 3 (Probability adjusted Suppes-Sen) For all ν ∈ R ++ and x, y ∈ X ν ,
Jointly with Axiom 2, Axiom 3 implies anonymity wrt. different individuals with the same probability of existence. Hence, permuting the well-being levels of individuals with the same probability of existence leads to an equally good allocation.
In line with Asheim and Zuber's (2014) axiomatization of rank-discounted criticallevel utilitarianism we impose independence to adding an individual only if the added individual is best-off (relative to two allocations with the same probability adjusted population size) or worst-off.
Axiom 4 (Existence independence of the best-off )
only if x y.
Axiom 5 (Existence independence of the worst-off ) For all x, y ∈ X, p ∈ (0, 1], and z ∈ R satisfying z ≤ min{x [0] ,
Moreover, we introduce a critical well-being level c ∈ R + , which if experienced by an added individual without changing the utilities of the existing population, leads to an alternative which is as good as the original if
is at least as large as the neutral well-being level.
Axiom 6 (Existence of a critical level) There exist c ∈ R + and ν ∈ R ++ such that for all p ∈ (0, 1] and
In the case with no risk (i.e., for the subset of allocations with x p i = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n(x)}), all axioms above are satisfied also by ordinary critical-level utilitarianism. However, as discussed by Arrhenius (forthcoming, Sect. 5.1), criticallevel utilitarianism has the properties that adding sufficiently many individuals with well-being just above c makes the allocation better than any fixed alternative (thus leading to the Repugnant conclusion if c = 0) and adding sufficiently many individuals with well-being just below c makes the allocation worse than any fixed alternative (thus leading to the Very sadistic conclusion if c > 0). The following axiom ensures that adding individuals at a given level of lifetime well-being has bounded importance, thereby avoiding the Repugnant and Very sadistic conclusions.
Axiom 7 (Existence of egalitarian equivalence) For all x, y ∈ X and p ∈ (0, 1], if x y, then there exists z ∈ R such that, for all N ∈ N, x (z) np y for some n ≥ N .
We will now state our main result, namely that these seven axioms characterize the probability adjusted rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarian SWOs.
Definition 1 An SWR on X is a probability adjusted rank-discounted criticallevel generalized utilitarian (PARDCLU) SWO if there exist c ∈ R + , δ ∈ R ++ , and a continuous and increasing function u : R → R such that, for all x, y ∈ X,
Parameter δ is the rank utility discount rate.
Theorem 1 The following two statements are equivalent.
(1) The SWR satisfies Axioms 1-7.
(2) The SWR is a PARDCLU SWO.
It follows from the PARDCLU SWO that c is the well-being level which, if experienced by an added individual without changing the utilities of the existing population, leads to an alternative which is as good as the original only if
) which depends on the well-being levels that exceed c (as well as the probability p with which the added individual exists). This follows from Definition 1, since adding an individual at well-being level x [ν(x)] increases welfare, while adding an individual at well-being level c lowers the weights assigned to individuals at well-being levels that exceed c and thereby reduces welfare.
Special cases
Cases with no risk correspond to situations where only allocations
In the dynamic formulation presented in Section 2, these correspond to cases where I t = {Ω} in all periods: states of the world are indistinguishable and do not affect well-being.
The implications of rank-discounted utilitarianism in such settings are discussed in Zuber and Asheim (2012) and Asheim and Zuber (2014) . With no risk the modeling here translates exactly to the variable population framework of Asheim and Zuber (2014) , while it specializes the fixed population framework of Zuber and Asheim (2012) to a situation with an unbounded but finite number of generations.
In this section, we highlight special cases with risk. First, we show how PARDCLU reduces to rank-dependent expected utilitarianism in the special case where the probability adjusted population size is equal to 1. Second, we discuss to what extent PARDCLU provides a foundation for discounting according to the probability of human extinction, as applied in, e.g., the Stern Review (2007, Ch. 2).
Rank-dependent expected utilitarianism. In the special fixed population case where only allocations x with probability adjusted population size ν(x) =
equal to 1 is considered, the result of Theorem 1 leads to rank-dependent expected utility maximization -where the decision maker substitutes 'decision weights' for probability -but with additional structure. Quiggin (1982) was the first to axiomatize such a theory for decisions under risk, even though the substitution of 'decision weights' for probability had been argued by earlier writers to explain behavior inconsistent with the vNM theory.
In the dynamic formulation presented in Section 2, where information is obtained in successive time periods, this corresponds to the case where the information structure (I t ) t∈N is given by I t = I = (i 1 , . . . , i S ) for all t ∈ N and the allocation process w is such that, for all s ∈ {1, . . . , S}, n t w (i s ) = 1 if t = 1 and n t w (i s ) = 0 if t > 1. Hence, we have essentially a static model where there is one individual existing (in period 1 only) independently of how the risk is resolved. We may choose to interpret this as one person being subject to a lottery where the prizes (w 1 (i 1 ) , . . . , w 1 (i S )) are won with probabilities (p(i 1 ), . . . , p(i S )), even though we thereby depart from our basic setting without individual risk.
Let π : {1, · · · , S} → {1, · · · , S} be a reordering of {1, · · · , S} that turns (w 1 (i 1 ),
). Then PARDCLU implies preferences for lotteries that are represented by:
where the probability weighting functions h r : [0, 1] S → [0, 1] are defined by
given by f (ρ) = (1 − e −δρ )/(1 − e −δ ) and using the convention 0 r =1 p(i π(r ) ) = 0. 5 Note that the function f is concave; the plausibility of this property is discussed by Quiggin (1987) . Our axioms (in particular, Axiom 5) lead to the special exponential structure displayed by function f . As can be easily checked by applying l'Hôpital's rule, f approaches the identify function as δ ↓ 0. Thus, if the probability adjusted population size equals 1, then PARDCLU approaches ordinary expected utility maximization as rank-discounting vanishes.
Human extinction. By appealing to Harsanyi's (1953) original position and using Harsanyi's (1955) theorem, Dasgupta and Heal (1979, pp. 269-275) justified the use of discounted utilitarianism where the utility discount rate is the probability of 5 This follows from Definition 1 by integrating the utility weights e −δρ , leading to the following cumulative utility weights: The variable population case where population remains constant up to the time of human extinction can be captured in the dynamic formulation presented in Section 2. We assume that the information structure (I t ) n∈N is a sequence of partitions constructed as follows, where E t denote the event that extinction has occurred by period t, and where the induction is initiated by setting I 0 = {Ω} and E 0 = ∅:
and E t denoting E t−1 ∪ i t .
• For t > T , I t = I T with E t denoting Ω.
We denote by π t = p(Ω \ E t )/p(Ω \ E t−1 ) the probability of survival in period t (∈ {1, · · · , T }) conditional on survival until t. For simplicity, we assume that π t = π (constant rate of survival). Hence the probability of existence of generation t is π t .
Construct the adapted allocation process w = (w t ) t∈N by, for all t ∈ N, w t (ω) = x w t if ω ∈ Ω \ E t and w t (ω) maps to the situation where no one exists if ω ∈ E t . Hence, we assume that population is constant and its size is normalized to 1 up to the time of extinction. If well-being is correlated with time so that w t ≤ w t+1 for all periods t ∈ {1, · · · , T }, then PARDCLU implies preferences over streams that are represented by:
where, as above, f : R + → R + is given by f (ρ) = (1 − e −δρ )/(1 − e −δ ), but with an extended domain. This follows from Definition 1 and the argument of footnote 5 by
Note that as δ ↓ 0, f approaches the identity function:
Therefore, as rank-discounting vanishes, PARDCLU approaches the principle of discounting utility according to the probability of human extinction, as applied by the Stern Review (2007, Ch. 2). However, for δ > 0, PARDCLU implies that utility is discounted according to both rank and the probability of human extinction. If well-being is correlated with time-which is the case considered above-discounting according to rank and the probability of human extinction reinforce each other, while they might pull in opposite directions otherwise. In all cases, well-being is also discounted according to the absolute well-being level if the function u is strictly concave, so that well-being is transformed into utility at a decreasing rate.
Equity and population ethics
We introduce equity concerns as inequality aversion with respect to the distribution of well-being. We follow the practice of expressing distributional equity ideals though a transfer axioms by considering a variation of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, but take into account the fact that people may have different probabilities of existing.
Axiom 8 (Probability adjusted Pigou-Dalton) For any x, y ∈ X, if n(x) = n(y) = n and there exist i, j ∈ {1, · · · , n} and ε ∈ R ++ such that
The condition under which Axiom 8 can be satisfied by PARDCLU criteria boils down to the concavity of the function u.
Proposition 1 A PARDCLU SWO on X satisfies Axiom 8 if and only if u is concave in the representation given in Definition 1.
The concavity of u is a standard condition for generalized utilitarian criteria respecting the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. It is however more surprising to find this condition for rank-dependent generalized utilitarian criteria. Indeed, in the similar case of risk aversion of rank-dependent expected utility criteria, Chateauneuf, Cohen and Meilijson (2005) proved that risk aversion implies that the probability transformation function must be more convex than the function u (function u must not be 'too convex'): the concavity of u is sufficient but not necessary for risk aversion. Zuber and Asheim (2012) showed that in the case of RDU criteria, the corresponding necessary and sufficient condition for inequality aversion was that an index of non-concavity of the function u was larger than β = e −δ . The difference in the presence setting is that we may have to compare individuals with arbitrarily small probabilities of existence so that the role of rank-discounting for ensuring inequality aversion becomes negligeable: we are then close to the generalized-utilitarian case where the concavity of u is necessary.
Interestingly, the Probability adjusted Pigou-Dalton principle can also be used to characterize PARDCLU together with critical-level generalized utilitarian criteria without assuming the Existence of egalitarian equivalence (Axiom 7). Let us first define probability adjusted critical-level generalized utilitarian SWOs.
Definition 2 An SWR on X is a probability adjusted critical-level generalized utilitarian (PACLU) SWO if there exist c ∈ R + and a continuous and increasing function u : R → R such that, for all x, y ∈ X,
Proposition 2 If The SWR on X satisfies Axioms 1-6 and Axiom 8, then it is either a PARDCLU SWO with u being concave or a PACLU SWO with u being strictly concave.
Asheim and Zuber (2014) discuss the population ethics of RDCLU when comparing populations of different sizes. In particular, they show that RDCLU criteria can avoid both the Repugnant conclusion and the Very sadistic conclusion. These results hold also for PARDCLU in terms of probability adjusted population size.
Through the following two propositions we provide additional results on the population ethics of PARDCLU. We first study what is the appropriate level of the critical-level parameter c in the representation of PARDCLU given in Definition 1.
To do so, we consider the following principles discussed in Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson (2005) .
Axiom 9 (Priority to lives worth living) For any x, y ∈ R, for any ν, ν ∈
Proposition 3 A PARDCLU SWO on X satisfies Axiom 9 if and only if c = 0
in the representation given in Definition 1.
Proposition 3 suggests that setting c = 0 is a natural choice if we consider that only lives above the neutrality level are worth living.
Another well-known principle of population ethics is the Mere addition principle, stating that it is always worth adding people with positive well-being. In our framework, it is formalized in the following way.
Axiom 10 (Mere addition) For any x ∈ X, for any z ∈ R ++ , and for any p ∈
PARDCLU criteria do not satisfy the Mere addition principle. This is clear when c > 0 because adding people with well-being below c decreases social welfare. This is also true when c = 0 because adding an individual with low positive well-being will decrease the weights on individuals with higher well-being and might thereby worsen the allocation. However, this drawback of PARDCLU must be considered in light of the following impossibility result.
Proposition 4 There is no SWO on X satisfying Axioms 1, 7, 8, 9 and 10.
Proposition 4 is related to the finding of Carlson (1998) that the Mere addition principle and a Non-anti egalitarianism principle imply a conclusion similar to the Repugnant conclusion. In our framework, avoiding the Repugnant conclusion is represented by our Axiom 7 and we use a Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (Axiom 8) to represent egalitarian concerns. The form of PARDCLU criteria also indicates why we may not want to satisfy the Mere addition principle: adding people with positive but very low well-being may increase relative poverty by adding people at low ranks in the distribution. This is an objection which is often made against the Mere addition principle (Arrhenius, forthcoming, chap. 7).
Discussion and concluding remarks
The present paper contributes to the fields of population ethics and social evaluation in risky situations by proposing and axiomatizing the probability adjusted rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarian (PARDCLU) SWO. We have shown how the PARDCLU approach can be used to handle the situation where there is a positive probability of human extinction. We have established how the PARDCLU SWO reduces to rank-dependent expected utility maximization with additional structure in the special case where the probability adjusted population size equals 1, thereby linking our criterion to the theory of decisions under risk. We have also highlighted some of the properties of the PARDCLU approach in terms of distributive equity and population ethics. On the latter topic, we have showed that PARDCLU can avoid drawbacks of other equitable approaches (such as utilitarian and egalitarian approaches).
When evaluating consequences that stretch centuries into the future, it seems less important to consider the fluctuations in well-being and individual risk that people face during their own lifetimes. Rather, the important issues are interpersonal in- there is risk is however more severe because not only the past, but also unrealized states of the world matter for social evaluation. This dependence on unrealized states of the world is not specific to PARDCLU: it also arises for criteria such as those suggested by Diamond (1967) , Epstein and Segal (1992) and Grant at al. (2010) .
Given this feature of PARDCLU criteria, there are two possible routes, which we want to explore in future work. One direction would be to reject consequentialism and assume that choices may depend on what could have happened. The issue then is whether the relevant information can be summarized in a practical way in specific economic environments, so that the dependence is manageable for public decision making. Another direction would be to accept that the social criterion is not timeconsistent, and to device techniques such as sophisticated planning (see Pollak, 1968; Blackorby et al., 1973 , for early references) to ensure the time consistency of choices (at the cost of optimality from the point of view of the initial criterion). We could compare in specific economic models such sophisticated planning to naive planning, in particular when fertility choices are endogenous.
A second important feature of evaluation based on PARDCLU is how it handles the risk on the planning horizon. According to PARDCLU, it is the total population, rather than the planning horizon, that matters. In particular, social evaluation based on PARDCLU is completely indifferent between having 10 billion people alive for 100 years and 1 billion people alive for 1000 years if all have the same well-being and live for sure, as total population is the same in both alternatives. One may object to this conclusion on the basis that people might prefer to live in a society with more people (so as to have richer scope for social interactions), or on the contrary to have more descendants.
Note that the issue extends to the case where population size is risky. If wellbeing is perfectly equal, then only expected total population size matters, so that society is completely risk neutral with respect to the risk on population size. Evaluation based on PARDCLU is indifferent whether n people exist for sure, or n 1 people exist with probability p and n 2 people with probability 1 − p, provided that pn 1 + (1 − p)n 2 = n. This is in stark contrast with criteria exhibiting catastrophe avoidance in the sense of Bommier and Zuber (2008) .
A last issue is sustainability. Zuber and Asheim (2012, Section 6) show how RDU leads to sustainable outcomes in models of economic growth within a setting where there are infinitely many time periods. This basic support for sustainability does not extend to the present criterion with endogenous population size and probability of existence, where the main concern is to avoid lives with low well-being.
A stark conclusion is that it might be socially preferable to increase the per-period probability of extinction if per capita well-being is decreasing over time, as this increases the utility weight on the better off earlier generations. This points towards re-evaluating the concept of sustainability in a context where the number of future generations is bounded and their existence is uncertain, and where there might be a trade-off between the number of future people and their well-being.
A possible way to deal with both the indifference to risk on total population size and the willingness to ensure the existence of future people would be to include sentiments, and in particular the altruistic feelings parents have towards their descendants. There is a growing literature on social and altruistic preferences, both from a theoretical and from an experimental perspective (classical references include Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Andreoni and Miller, 2002) . In general, there might be an argument in favor of distinguishing the conception of justice from the forces (like altruism) that are instrumental in attaining it, e.g., if impartiality follows from considering an original position where individuals do not have extensive times of natural sentiments (Rawls, 1971, p. 129) . However, considering the social context in which people live seems essential when applying PARDCLU in a setting where population size and probability of existence are endogenous. In particular, a more pro-natal implication would follow if we assume that the well-being of individuals depends also on their reproductive choices, so that well-being of one generation increases with the size and living conditions of the next generation.
The implications of including sentiments for the PARDCLU approach (and for population ethics in general) is left for future research.
Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
To prove the Theorem 1, we need to introduce subsets of X. For any k ∈ N, denote by X 1/k = x ∈ X : x p i = 1/k, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n(x)} the set of allocations where all individuals have the same rational probability 1/k of existing. Denote by Q ++ the positive rational numbers and by X Q ++ = x ∈ X : x p i ∈ Q ++ , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n(x)} the set of allocations where all individuals have probabilities of existing which are positive rational numbers.
It is straightforward to show that (2) implies (1) in Theorem 1. We show that (1) implies (2) by proving the four following lemmas.
We start with Lemmas 1 and 2 which establish how the representation result of Asheim and Zuber (2014) can be extended to the present case as long as the probabilities of existence are given by rational numbers.
Lemma 1 If Axioms 1-7 hold, then there exists c ∈ R + , δ ∈ R ++ and a continuous and increasing function u : R → R such that for any k ∈ N for any x, y ∈ X 1/k ,
Proof. For any k ∈ N, Axioms 1-7 above restricted to X 1/k collapse to Axioms 1-7
of Asheim and Zuber (2014) , provided we take p = 1/k in Axioms 4-7. Hence, by Theorem 1 of Asheim and Zuber (2014) there exist β 1/k ∈ (0, 1) and a continuous increasing function u 1/k : R → R such that, for all x, y ∈ X 1/k , x y if and only if
where the critical level parameter c is determined by Axiom 6 and is therefore independent of k, and where the factor 1 − β 1/k ensures that utility weights sum up
1/k and 1 − β n(y) 1/k respectively. Consider any x, y ∈ X 1 such that n(x) = n(y) = n. For any k ∈ N, construct x,ŷ ∈ X 1/k such that n(x) = n(ŷ) = nk and, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n},x w ki−j = x w i and y w ki−j = y w i for all j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. By construction,
By Axioms 1, 2 and 3, we have x y ⇐⇒x ŷ, and therefore, using the above representation:
Because additive representations are unique up to an affine transformation, the above equivalence implies β k 1/k = β 1 and that we can set u 1/k = u 1 , using the normalization u 1/k (0) = u 1 (0) = 0.
Denoting p = 1/k and δ = − ln β 1 , this implies that
Moreover, since
and by denoting u = u 1 we can rewrite inequality (A.1) as:
where ν(x) = n(x)/k and ν(y) = n(y)/k. This establishes Lemma 1.
Lemmas 2 is concerned only with the same-number case, as a separate argument has to be used anyway for the case where the difference between the probability adjusted population size of two different allocations is irrational.
Lemma 2 If Axioms 1-7 hold, then there exists c ∈ R + , δ ∈ R ++ and a continuous and increasing function u : R → R such that for any ν ∈ Q ++ , for any x, y ∈ X Q ++ such that ν(x) = ν(y) = ν,
Proof. For any x, y ∈ X Q ++ such that ν(x) = ν(y) = ν, let k be the least common denominator of all the probabilities in the two allocations. This means that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n(x}} there exists a positive integer x i such that x We can constructx,ŷ ∈ X 1/k in the following way: 6 (a) For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n(x)},x w
(b) For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n(y)},ŷ w [ ] , and
by Axioms 1, 2, 3, and Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 shows how the representation of Lemma 2 in the same-number case (where the compared allocations have the same probability adjusted population size)
can be applied also when probabilities of existence are allowed to irrational, using the property that the rational numbers are dense in the real numbers.
Lemma 3 If Axioms 1-7 hold, then there exist c ∈ R + , δ ∈ R ++ and a continuous and increasing function u : R → R such that for any ν ∈ R ++ , for any x, y ∈ X ν ,
Proof. Consider any ν ∈ R ++ , and any x, y ∈ X ν . If x, y ∈ Q ++ (so that ν ∈ Q ++ ), then Lemma 2 yields the result. Assume therefore that x, y / ∈ Q ++ and more specifically that x p i ∈ Q ++ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n(x) − 1}, y p i ∈ Q ++ for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n(y) − 1}, and x n(x) , y n(y) / ∈ Q ++ . Assuming that the last individual is the one with an irrational probability of existing is made without loss of generality because of Axiom 3. Extension of the proof to more than one individual with an irrational probability of existing is similar to the one developed below. Because of Axiom 1, equivalence (A.2) holds if and only if the following equivalence holds:
Step 1:
6 Using the convention 0 j=1 
Letν ∈ Q ++ such that 0 <ν − ν < 1, and denotep =ν − ν. Let px ∈ Q ++ be such that 0 < px <x p n(x) and denote εx =x p n(x) − px. Likewise, let p y ∈ Q ++ be such that x p n(y) < p y <p and denote
By Axioms 1 and 3, (x, zp) (y, zp) =⇒x ŷ .
Also, by construction,x,ŷ ∈ X Q ++ . 7 Hence, by Lemma 2, we know that
Letr be the rank of x n(x) inx and r be the rank of y n(y) in y. By definition of
we have: 
This implication is true for any (εx, ε y ) ∈ R 2 ++ as defined above. Since rational number are dense in the real number, it is possible to find a sequence of ((εx, ε y )) ∈ (R 2 ) N such that each of εx and ε y tends to zero. Hence: Step 2:
Since rational number are dense in real numbers, it is possible to find (ε x , ε y ) ∈ (0, 1) 2 such that p x = x Figure 1: Allocations involved in Step 1 of the proof and p y = y p n(y) − ε y satisfy (p x , p y ) ∈ Q 2 ++ , and:
wherer is the rank of x n(x) in x, r is the rank of y n(y) in y, and z = max{x [ν] 
Let ε x <p < 1 be such thatν = ν +p satisfiesν ∈ Q ++ . We can constructx, y ∈ Xν in the following way:
(b)ŷ i = y i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n(y) − 1};ŷ n(y) = (y w n(y) , p y );ŷ n(y)+1 = (z,p + ε y ); Figure 2 ). Figure 2: Allocations involved in Step 2 of the proof By Lemma 2 and by construction ofx andŷ, Proof.
Step 1: Representation when well-being does not exceed c.
Let c ∈ R + be the critical level parameter defined in Axiom 6.
Assume that x, y ∈ X are such that x Step 2: Equally distributed equivalent.
For any ν ∈ R ++ and x ∈ X ν , let the ν-equally distributed equivalent of x, denoted e ν (x), be x ∈ R such that (x) ν ∼ x. Axioms 1-3 imply that e ν : X ν → R is well-defined. By Lemma 3, and since Axioms 1-7 hold, it is defined as follows:
e ν (x) = u Let x ∈ X ν and z < min{x [0] , c}, leading to the following expression for k ∈ N:
e ν+k x, (z) k = u function of k converging to 1. Since z < x [0] ≤ e ν (x) and e ν+k x, (z) k = u −1 a(k)u(z) + (1 − a(k))u e ν (x) , it follows that e ν+k x, (z) k is a decreasing function of k converging to z as k approaches infinity. As z < c, we deduce that, for any x ∈ X, there exists K(x) ∈ N such that, for all k ≥ K(x), e ν(x)+k x, (z) k ≤ c.
Step 3: Conclusion. For any x, y ∈ X, choose z such that z < min{x [0] , y [0] , z}.
Let = max{K(x), K(y)}, x = e ν(x)+ x, (z) and y = e ν(y)+ y, (z) . By definition, (x, (z) ) ∼ (x) ν(x)+ , (y, (z) ) ∼ (y) ν(y)+ , x ≤ c and y ≤ c. Hence, by repeated applications of Axioms 1 and 5, and by
x y ⇐⇒ (x, (z) ) (y, (z) )
⇐⇒ ( which is strictly positive when u is concave, since then e −δ(ρ−ρ) < 1 and u(x w j + ε) − u(x w j ) u(x w i ) − u(x w i − ε)
Hence the concavity of u is sufficient to guarantee that x y as required by Axiom 8.
The following lemma is used to prove Proposition 2.
Lemma 5 If the SWR on X satisfies Axioms 1-6 and 8, then for any k ∈ N one of the following must be true:
1. There exists β 1/k ∈ (0, 1) and a continuous and increasing function u 1/k : R → R such that, for all x, y ∈ X 1/k , x y if and only if Proof. Axioms 1-6 above restricted to X 1/k collapse to Axioms 1-6 of Asheim and Zuber (2014), provided we take p = 1/k in Axioms 4-6. Hence, by Lemma 1 of Asheim and Zuber (2014) there exist β 1/k ∈ R ++ and a continuous increasing function u 1/k : R → R such that, for all x, y ∈ X 1/k such that n(x) = n(y) = n, Consider x, y ∈ X 1/k such that n(x) = n(x) = 2, x w 1 = z ≤ z = x w 2 , y w 1 = z − ε < z + ε = y w 2 and x 
